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Abstract:	   In	  this	  opinion	  piece,	  the	  authors	  offer	  their	  personal	  and	  idiosyncratic	  views	  of	  the	  future	  of	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  science,	  focusing	  on	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  history	  of	  science	  and	  metaphysics,	  respectively.	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  former,	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  Kantian	  tradition	  might	  be	  drawn	  upon	  both	  to	  render	  the	  
history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  more	  relevant	  to	  philosophy	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  to	  overcome	  the	  challenges	  
posed	  by	  naturalism.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   latter,	   they	   suggest	  both	   that	  metaphysics	  has	  much	   to	   learn	  
from	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   and	   that	   it	   offers	   an	   array	   of	   tools	   that	   philosophers	   of	   science	   can	  
themselves	  appropriate.	  
	  
Keywords:	  Kant;	  metaphysics;	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  
	  
	  
Philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  entering	  a	  new	  exciting	  era.	  As	  the	  editors	  of	  the	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  
Science	  (BJPS),	  we	  witness	  an	  enlarged	  horizon	  of	  topics,	  areas,	  and	  buzzing	  interactions	  between	  philosophy	  
and	  the	  sciences	  that	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  journal,	  back	  in	  1950,	  could	  not	  possibly	  have	  dreamt	  of.	  While	  the	  
programmatic	   intent	   of	   the	   journal	   in	   the	   original	   Editorial	  was	   to	   explore	   “the	  whole	   range	   of	   science—
physical,	  biological,	  and	  psychological”	  and	  take	  “science,	  both	  past	  and	  present	   .	   .	   .	  as	  the	  primary	  datum	  
for	   consideration”	   (BJPS	   1950,	   3	   and	  4),	   it	  would	  have	  been	  hard	   to	  predict	   how—some	   sixty-­‐three	   years	  
later—the	  complex	  dynamics	  between	  philosophy	  and	  science	  would	  have	  radically	  changed	  the	  landscape	  
of	   the	   subject	   area.	   From	   foundational	   studies	   of	   physics,	   to	   evolutionary	   developmental	   biology;	   from	  
neuroimaging	  and	  evolutionary	  psychology	  to	  causal	  decision	  theories	  and	  signal-­‐	  ling	  games:	  these	  are	  just	  
a	  few	  of	  the	  many	  faces	  of	  contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  The	  field	  has	  expanded	  in	  myriad	  directions,	  
and	  has	  engaged	   in	   serious	  conversation	  with	   the	   sciences	  at	   large,	   following	   the	  naturalistic	   trend	  of	   the	  
second	  half	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  We	  could	  never	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  current	  panorama,	  and	  do	  
not	   even	   attempt	   in	   what	   follows	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   many	   intricate	   and	   alluring	   topics	   and	  
subfields	  on	  which	  we	  have	  the	  honour	  of	  publishing.	  The	  interested	  reader	  is	  kindly	  referred	  to	  the	  table	  of	  
contents	  of	  any	  issue	  of	  the	  BJPS	  for	  that.	  
Instead,	  given	  the	  aim	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  contribution	  as	  an	  opinion	  piece,	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  
follow	  a	  more	  familiar	  path	  in	  providing	  two	  personal,	  inevitably	  incomplete,	  and	  unashamedly	  idiosyncratic	  
views	   of	   how	   we	   see	   the	   field	   evolving.	   The	   views	   are	   personal	   as	   they	   reflect	   our	   respective	   personal	  
research	  interests	  in	  the	  field	  as	  authors,	  before	  being	  editors	  (and,	  in	  fact,	  quite	  independently	  of	  our	  role	  
	  as	  editors	  of	  the	  BJPS).	  They	  are	  inevitably	  incomplete,	  as	  the	  short	  remarks	  here	  below	  cannot	  possibly	  do	  
justice	  even	  to	  the	  two	  chosen	  trends	  (history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  [HPS]	  and	  metaphysics	  of	  science)	  
on	  which	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  concentrate.	  They	  are	  finally	  unashamedly	  idiosyncratic,	  because	  they	  reflect	  
our	   individual	   take	   on	   each	   of	   these	   two	   fields.	   In	   what	   follows,	   we	   take	   a	   look	   in	   turn	   at	   HPS	   and	   the	  
metaphysics	  of	  science,	  as	  just	  two	  families	  inhabiting	  the	  many-­‐storeyed	  house	  of	  contemporary	  philosophy	  
of	  science.	  Although	  the	  limited	  selection	  of	  subfields	  preempts	  any	  temptation	  to	  draw	  grand	  conclusions	  
about	  the	  future	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  we	  hope	  that	  what	  follows	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  spring-­‐	  board	  for	  wider	  
reflections	  on	  how	  each	  of	  these	  two	  areas	  has	  affected	  the	  remit	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  is	  
bound	  to	  shape	  (at	  least	  in	  part)	  its	  future.	  
	  
	  
A	  New	  Era	  for	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  
	  
When	   it	   comes	   to	   new	  directions	   in	   the	   vast	   field	   of	  philosophy	  of	   science,	   it	   is	   hard	   not	   to	  mention	   the	  
recent	  revival	  of	  the	  trend	  that	  goes	  under	  the	  name	  of	  HPS,	  or	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  Since	  both	  
of	  us	  work	  on	  and	  have	  made	  contributions	  to	  HPS,	  we	  have	  chosen	  it	  as	  our	  first	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  
future	  directions	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  with	  an	  important	  caveat.	  Once	  more,	  the	  following	  reflections	  on	  
the	  status	  of	  HPS	  and	  its	  future	  are	  just	  personal	  considerations	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  our	  own	  work	  in	  
the	  field.	  They	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  reflections	  about	  BJPS	  publishing	  policy	  or	  editorial	  directions.1	  
Caveat	   aside,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   recent	   times	   have	   witnessed	   a	   very	   productive	   and	   renewed	  
interaction	   between	   philosophy	   of	   science	   and	   history	   of	   science.	   Far	   from	   being	   a	   remnant	   of	   foregone	  
times,	   when	   the	   likes	   of	   Popper,	   Lakatos,	   Kuhn,	   and	   Feyerabend	   set	   out	   HPS	   as	   a	   distinctive	   discipline,	  
contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  explored	  promising	  new	  ways	  of	  drawing	  on	  the	  history	  of	  science	  
to	  illuminate	  both	  old	  and	  new	  philosophical	  problems.	  	  Be	  it	  foundational	  issues	  about	  	  spacetime	  	  theories	  	  
(see,	  e.g.,	  Norton	  1985,	  2000,	  2008;	  and	  Howard	  1985,	  2010)	  or	  the	  science	  of	  measurement	  or	  metrology	  
(Chang	  2004;	  Tal	  2011;	  Teller	  2013);	  be	  it	  realism	  and	  anti-­‐realism	  about	  science	  (Giere	  2006;	  Stanford	  2006;	  
van	   Fraassen	   2008),	   or	   the	   nature	   of	   scientific	   theories	   and	   models	   (Morrison	   2000);	   be	   it	   biological	  
complexity	   (Mitchell	   2009)	   or	   the	   evolution	   of	   physical	   concepts	   (Arabatzis	   2006),	   the	   many	   faces	   of	  
contemporary	   HPS	   show	   how	   thriving	   the	   field	   is.	   A	   new	   national	   and	   international	   movement,	   called	  
Integrated	  HPS,	   to	  which	   both	   of	   us	   have	   actively	   contributed	   since	   its	   foundation	   back	   in	   2006,	   provide	  
annual	  national	  and	  biennial	  international	  gatherings	  where	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  in	  the	  field	  is	  presented.	  The	  
programmatic	   manifesto	   recommends	   more	   than	   just	   the	   Lakatosian	   dictum	   of	   a	   historically	   informed	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  on	  pain	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  being	  empty.	  Good	  HPS	  is	  not	  philosophy	  of	  science	  
with	  interspersed	  case	  studies.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  both	  good	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  good	  history	  of	  science.	  It	  is	  
philosophy	   of	   science	   that	   brings	   history	   of	   science	   to	   the	   fore	   and	   genuinely	   draws	   on	   it,	   without	   any	  
preconceived	  philosophical	  agenda.	  
In	   some	   philosophical	   quarters,	   noses	   turn	   up	   at	   the	   idea	   of	   philosophy	   of	   science	   drawing	   on	   the	  
history	  of	  science.	  For	  surely	  the	  normative	  role	  of	  philosophy	  would,	  appear	  to	  some	  to	  be	  impoverished	  by	  
renewed	  attention	  to	  the	  history	  of	  science.	  Prejudices	  aside,	  two	  challenges	  stand	  on	  the	  way	  of	  HPS	  as	  a	  
promising	  direction	  of	  research:	  
	  
I.	  Disciplinary	  enclaving:	  we	  are	  using	  a	  strong	  word	  here	  to	  convey	  the	  perceived	  uneasiness	   felt	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  BJPS	  publishes	  first-­‐rate	  articles	  in	  HPS,	  among	  many	  other	  areas,	  although	  HPS	  does	  not	  constitute	  the	  distinctive	  
remit	  of	  the	  journal,	  by	  contrast	  with	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  (A,	  B,	  and	  C),	  among	  other	  journals.	  
	  some	  HPS	  quarters	  of	  working	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  broader	  philosophy	  community,	  as	  testified	  by	  the	  
low	  presence	  of	  HPS	  papers	  at	  the	  meetings	  of	  several	  main	  philosophical	  societies,	  for	  example.	  What	  
good	  is	  HPS	  to	  philosophy,	  in	  general?	  
	  
II.	  Naturalism,	  or	  when	  a	  virtue	  may	  become	  a	  vice:	  that	  philosophical	   inquiry	  should	  be	  continuous	  
with	  science	  is	  a	  hard-­‐to-­‐resist	  tenet	  after	  Quine.	  That	  philosophy	  of	  science	  should	  engage	  with	  the	  
details	  of	  actual	   scientific	  practice	   is	  also	  a	   sine	  qua	  non	  of	  any	  credible	   inquiry	   into	  science	  and	   its	  
modes	  of	  inquiry.	  But	  how	  to	  walk	  the	  thin	  line	  between	  philosophy	  and	  the	  sciences?	  
	  
The	  two	  challenges	  seem	  to	  be	  pulling	  HPS	  in	  opposite	  directions.	  Any	  serious	  attempt	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  with	  
philosophy	  seems	  prima	  facie	   to	   force	  HPS	  away	   from	   its	  naturalistic	   leanings;	  as	  much	  as	   following	  those	  
leanings	  risks	  transforming	  HPS	  into	  a	  series	  of	  scientific	  case	  studies.	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  selectively	  look	  at	  
a	  possible	   (by	  no	  means	  exclusive)	  way	  of	  addressing	   these	   two	  challenges	   in	  contemporary	  HPS,	  namely,	  
“dynamic	  Kantianism.”	  
	  
How	  to	  Bridge	  the	  Gap	  Between	  HPS	  and	  Philosophy:	  The	  “Back	  to	  Kant”	  Recipe	  
	  
There	  is	  something	  prima	  facie	  surprising	  about	  the	  recent	  revival	  of	  Kantianism	  in	  HPS.	  	  For	  surely	  nothing	  
would	   seem	   more	   remote	   from	   contemporary	   scientific	   practice	   than	   Kant’s	   outmoded	   view	   of	   natural	  
science.	  Why	  hark	  back	  to	  Kant	  and	  neo-­‐Kantianism	  in	  our	  post-­‐	  Euclidean	  and	  post-­‐Newtonian	  world?	  (See	  
Wilson	   2010.)	   How	   could	   Kant’s	   philosophy	   ever	   illuminate	   the	   nature	   of	   contemporary	   physics	   without	  
mentioning	  biology	  or	  cognitive	  sciences?	  The	  ideas	  of	  apodeictic	  certainty	  and	  necessity,	  which	  formed	  the	  
bedrock	  of	  Kant’s	  program,	  were	  long	  ago	  discarded.	  
Yet	  there	  is	  some	  profound	  insight	  in	  the	  Kantian	  tradition	  that	  con-­‐	  temporary	  HPS	  can	  still	  draw	  on.	  
And	   this	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   knowledge,	   of	   how	   we	   come	   to	   know	   what	   we	   do,	   should	   be	  
addressed	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   natural	   sciences	   and	   at	   the	   specific	  ways	   in	  which	   knowledge	   of	   the	   natural	  
world	  is	  gained	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  Two	  centuries	  after	  Kant	  in	  the	  Prolegomena	  raised	  the	  question	  “How	  is	  
natural	   science	   possible?”	   contemporary	   HPS	   scholars	   find	   themselves	   asking	   similar	   questions.	   How	   is	   it	  
possible	   for	   us	   to	   have	   the	   experience	   of	   nature	   delivered	   by	   contemporary	   science?	   How	   has	   our	  
experience	  of	  nature	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  across	  scientific	  revolutions,	  with	  the	  advent	  of,	  say,	  relativity	  
theory	   and	   quantum	   mechanics?	   Most	   important	   of	   all,	   in	   our	   post-­‐Kuhnian	   world,	   how	   could	   these	  
transitions	   occur?	   Following	   the	   well-­‐trodden	   path	   of	   neo-­‐Kantianism	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   last	   century,	  
contemporary	   HPS	   scholars	   can	   pursue	   these	   questions	   with	   an	   eye	   both	   towards	   the	   broader	  
epistemological	  framework	  within	  which	  they	  arise	  and	  towards	  history	  of	  science	  and	  history	  of	  philosophy	  
of	  science.	  
HPS	   inquiry,	   then,	   does	   not	   reduce	   to	   a	  mere	   investigation	   into	   the	  methodology	   of	   science.	   But	   it	  
becomes	   continuous	  with	   epistemology,	   or	  with	  what	   the	  Marburg	   School	   called	  Erkenntnistheorie,	  while	  
also	  fruitfully	  drawing	  on	  the	  rich	  and	  complex	  details	  of	  scientific	  history.	  In	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  Michael	  
Friedman	  (1992,	  1999,	  2001,	  2010)	  has	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  philosophical	  tradition	  for	  
contemporary	   HPS,	   and	   beautifully	   exemplified	   (in	   our	   view)	   a	   possible	   way	   in	   which	   HPS	   can	   avoid	   the	  
aforementioned	  disciplinary	  enclaving.	  “Dynamic	  Kantianism,”	  as	  Friedman	  brands	  his	  view,	  shows	  the	  good	  
that	  comes	  from	  embedding	  the	  practice	  of	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  within	  epistemology	  (broadly	  
construed).	  And	  it	  has	  opened	  up	  promising	  new	  avenues	  of	  research,	  both	  for	  a	  serious	  re-­‐appraisal	  of	  the	  
historical	  and	  philosophical	  foundations	  of	  physics	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Ryckman	  2005,	  2012)	  and	  for	  the	  vast	  area	  that	  
goes	  under	  the	  name	  of	  history	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  (HOPOS),	  whereby	  the	  history	  of	  the	  discipline	  can	  
	  provide	  precious	  insights	  into	  the	  epistemological	  foundations	  of	  HPS	  (regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  embraces	  
dynamic	  Kantianism;	  see,	  e.g.,	  Richardson	  1998,	  2002).	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But,	   one	   may	   wonder,	   how	   can	   Kantianism	   help	   with	   the	   challenge	   of	   naturalism	   mentioned	   above?	   If	  
anything,	  the	  naturalistic	  trend	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  of	  the	  past	  fifty	  years	  originated	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  
Kantianism.	  Quine’s	  naturalism	  was	  the	  last	  straw	  that	  put	  to	  an	  end	  any	  attempt	  	  to	  defend	  not	  only	  Kant’s	  
distinction	   	   between	   analytic	   and	   synthetic	   knowledge	   but	   also	   Carnap’s	  Aufbau	   (rooted	   as	   it	   was	   in	   the	  
Kantian	   tradition;	   see	   Friedman	   1999).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Thomas	   Kuhn’s	   (1962)	   new	   agenda	   for	   HPS	  
cemented	  what	  Kitcher	  (1992)	  has	  poignantly	  portrayed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “radical	  naturalism,”	  which	  was	  bound	  
to	   make	   philosophy	   of	   science	   a	   chapter	   of	   history	   of	   science,	   or,	   after	   Kuhn,	   a	   chapter	   of	   sociology	   of	  
science	  or	  science	  studies.	  By	  reacting	  to	  the	  logical	  empiricist	  tradition	  that	  he	  saw	  still	  exemplified	  by	  Carl	  
Gustav	  Hempel,	  Kuhn	  rediscovered	  the	  central	  role	  that	  history	  of	  science	  plays	  for	  philosophical	  questions	  
about	  the	  structure	  of	  scientific	  revolutions	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  theory-­‐choice.	  
The	  healthy	  naturalistic	  trend	  of	  the	  past	  half	  century	  enjoins	  philosophers	  of	  science	  to	  dig	  into	  the	  
details	  of	  actual	  scientific	  practice	  as	  much	  as	  it	  enjoins	  HPS	  scholars	  to	  plunge	  into	  the	  details	  of	  scientific	  
history.	  We	  witness	  this	  healthy	  naturalistic	  trend	  in	  the	  BJPS	  publishing	  tradition,	  where	  first-­‐rate	  work	   in	  
contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science	  comes	  from	  a	  serious	  engagement	  with	  scientific	  practice.	  New	  exciting	  
research	   on	   neuroimaging	   being	   used	   to	   illuminate	   old	   philosophical	   questions	   about	   theories	   of	   mind;	  
detailed	   analyses	   of	  modelling	   practices	   bearing	   on	   pressing	   questions	   about	   climate	   change;	   population	  
genetics	  models	  questioning	  perennial	  issues	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  selection:	  these	  are	  just	  three	  examples	  of	  
how	  contemporary	  philosophy	  of	   science	  has	   flourished	  under	   the	  naturalistic	   trend.	   In	   the	  HPS	   tradition,	  
the	  naturalistic	  trend	  is	  in	  turn	  reflected	  in	  a	  serious	  engagement	  with	  the	  sciences	  of	  the	  past;	  and	  not	  just	  
with	   textual	   evidence	   but	   also	   with	   past	   experimental	   traditions	   and	   the	   conceptual	   resources	   made	  
available	  by	  them,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  images	  of	  nature	  were	  in	  fact	  accessible	  to	  the	  scientists	  of	  
the	  past.	  
The	  worry—as	  always—is	  how	  to	  walk	  the	  thin	  line	  that	  separates	  philosophy	  from	  science	  (past	  and	  
present).	  Or	  better,	  how	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  (past	  and	  present)	  sciences	  in	  a	  philosophically	  compelling	  way,	  
rather	  than	  leaving	  the	  sciences	  to	  speak	  for	  themselves,	  as	  it	  were.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  rehearse	  the	  old	  
dispute	  whether	  philosophy	  (in	  this	  case,	  philosophy	  of	  science)	  should	  or	  should	  not	  have	  a	  normative	  role.	  
Instead,	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  fruitful	  interaction	  between	  science,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  both	  
philosophy	   of	   science	   and	   HPS,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	   a	   two-­‐way	   (rather	   than	   one-­‐way)	   street.	   Scientific	  
practice	   (past	  or	  present)	  should	   inform	  philosophical	   inquiry,	  as	  much	  as	  the	   latter	  can	  and	  should	  throw	  
light	  on	  the	  former	  via	  its	  own	  rules	  and	  investigative	  methods.	  
The	   “back	   to	   Kant”	   recipe,	   once	   again,	   may	   help	   here.	   Kant’s	   philosophy	   of	   natural	   science	   was	  
informed	  by	   the	   sciences	  of	  his	   time,	   as	  much	  as	   it	  was	  meant	   to	   illuminate	   their	   foundations	  by	   its	  own	  
philosophical	  lights.	  Dynamic	  Kantianism	  no	  longer	  invokes	  a	  priori	  categories	  of	  the	  understanding	  or	  pure	  
forms	  of	  intuitions,	  it	  instead	  takes	  the	  lead	  from	  logical	  empiricism	  (especially	  Carnap	  and	  Reichenbach)	  to	  
provide	   a	   new	   spin	   on	   Kant’s	   old	   notion	   of	   “constitutive	   a	   priori,”	   as	   it	   may	   still	   be	   applicable	   to	  
contemporary	  physics	  with	  all	  due	  provisos	  (see	  Friedman	  2001	  and	  2010).	  Friedman’s	  notion	  of	  “relativized	  
constitutive	  a	  priori”	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  an	  ongoing	  debate,	  as	  many	  HPS	  scholars	  would	  firmly	  resist	  both	  its	  
Kantian	   spirit	   and	   its	   applicability	   to	  modern	   physics.	   But	   in	   our	   view,	   the	  merit	   of	   this	   trend	   consists	   in	  
having	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  role	  of	  our	  scientific	  history	  both	  for	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  
for	  epistemology.	  Within	  this	  tradition,	  Newton	  and	  Einstein	  become	  philosophical	  figures	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  
	  whose	  scientific	  work	  integrates	  into	  and	  illuminates	  the	  very	  epistemological	  foundations	  of	  science.	  This	  is	  
just	  one	  of	  the	  many	  ways	  (and	  obviously	  not	  an	  exclusive	  one)	  in	  which	  the	  challenge	  of	  naturalism	  can	  be	  
satisfactorily	  met.	  It	  certainly	  does	  so	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  philosophy,	  more	  in	  general;	  accordingly,	  it	  is	  an	  
enticing	  way	  of	  addressing	  both	  aforementioned	  challenges.	  
If	  the	  aforementioned	  interaction	  between	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  epistemology,	  and	  history	  of	  science	  
constitutes	   in	   our	   view	   a	   promising	   frontier	   in	   the	   field,	   another	   prominent	   one	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	  
interaction	  between	  science,	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  and	  metaphysics.	  There	   is	  now	  a	  growing	  appreciation	  
that	   the	   often	   fraught	   relationship	  with	   contemporary	  metaphysics	  might	   be	   improved,	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	  
both	  metaphysicians	  and	  philosophers	  of	  science.	  It	  is	  to	  this	  renewed	  interest	  in	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  science	  
that	  we	  turn	  next.	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From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  over	  the	  past	  one	  hundred	  years	  or	  so,	  the	  
relationship	  with	  metaphysics	   has	   been	   at	   best	   an	  uneasy	  one.	  Dismissed	  by	   the	  positivists	   as	   sterile	   and	  
useless,	  and	  more	  recently	  as	  a	  dead	  intellectual	  pursuit,	  metaphysics	  has	  been	  further	  excoriated	  as	  reliant	  
on	  simplistic	  intuitions	  or,	  at	  best,	  school	  yard	  science	  (Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  2007).	  Nevertheless,	  that	  it	  should	  
be	   perceived	   as	   having	   drifted	   so	   far	   from	   any	   mooring	   in	   physics	   is	   surprising,	   first,	   given	   the	   way	   its	  
heroes—here	   the	   likes	  of	  Putnam	  and	  Quine	   in	  particular	  come	  to	  mind—drew	  on	  the	  physics	  of	   the	  day,	  
secondly,	  given	  the	  way	  in	  which	  today’s	  practitioners	  model	  their	  meta-­‐metaphysical	  moves	  on	  what	  they	  
see	   as	   the	   methodology	   of	   the	   sciences—appealing	   to	   simplicity,	   explanatory	   power,	   and	   the	   like—and	  
thirdly,	   and	   perhaps	  most	   significantly,	   given	   the	   widely	   held	   commitment	   to	   some	   form	   of	   physicalism.	  
Perhaps	  the	  answer	   lies	   in	  the	  move	  to	  the	  modal,	  so	  characteristic	  of	  modern	  metaphysics,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
which	   the	   latter	   is	   now	   seen	   as	   primarily	   concerned	  with	   the	   possible,	   rather	   than	   the	   actual	   (Callender,	  
2011).	  Given	  the	  size	  of	  possibility	  space	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  actuality	  occupies	  such	  a	  small	  fragment	  of	  it,	  is	  it	  
any	  wonder—this	   line	  of	  speculation	  goes—that	  metaphysicians	  would	  prefer	   to	   roam	  the	  vast	   reaches	  of	  
the	  former	  rather	  than	  get	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  grubby	  intricacies	  of	  the	  latter?	  
Of	   course,	   if	   the	   limits	   of	   possibility	   are	   delineated	   by	  what	   is	   conceivable,	   the	   actual	  may	   appear	  
dwarfed	   by	   all	   the	   possibilities.	   Conceivability	   figures	   prominently	   in	   philosophical	   discussions	   of	   the	  
epistemology	   of	   modality	   (for	   a	   useful	   introduction	   see	   http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-­‐
epistemology/).	  Broadly	  speaking,	  success	  in	  conceiving	  of	  some	  claim,	  concept,	  or,	  indeed,	  world	  is	  taken	  to	  
support	  (or	  even	  entail)	  that	  the	  claim,	  concept,	  or	  world	  is	  possible.	  The	  nature	  of	  conceiving,	  whether	  it	  is	  
equivalent	   to	   imagining	   or	   goes	   beyond	   imagining,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   involves	   construction	   and	   the	  
nature	  of	  such	  construction	  loom	  large	  in	  these	  discussions.	  In	  particular,	  if	  conceivability	  is	  strongly	  tied	  to	  
imaginability,	  then	  one	  might	  demand	  general	  conditions	  governing	  the	  latter,	  such	  that	  imagining	  a	  world	  
or	   situation	   is	   sufficient	   to	  provide	  evidence	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	   such	  a	   situation.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	   such	  
conditions,	  one	  should	  at	  least	  acknowledge	  that	  conceivability	  is	  defeasible,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  may	  not	  
be	   aware	   of	   some	   consideration	   that	   undermines	   the	   relevant	   evidential	   link	   (Yablo	   1993).	   Black’s	   two-­‐
sphere	   counterexample	   to	   the	   Identity	   of	   Indiscernibles	   appears	   to	   fit	   this	  model	   quite	   nicely,	   as	  Hacking	  
(1975)	   effectively	   drew	   on	   considerations	   from	  physics	   (specifically	   General	   Relativity)	   to	   show	   that	  what	  
Black	  had	  conceived	  was	  not	  sufficiently	  fine-­‐grained	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  relevant	  possibility.	  
Of	   course,	   even	   if	   no	   such	   consideration	   is	   immediately	   apparent,	   it	  may	   still	   be	   “out	   there,”	   as	   it	  
were,	   and	   hence	   one	  might	   insist	   that	   all	   but	   the	  most	   simple	   conceptions	   should	   be	   held	   as	   potentially	  
defeasible.	   One	   can	   even	   imagine,	   or	   conceive	   of	   (!),	   a	   kind	   of	   spectrum,	   beginning	   with	   prima	   facie	  
conceivability,	   in	  which	  one	   simply	   conceives	   of	   or	   imagines	   a	   situation	  without	   thinking	   further	   about	   it,	  
	  moving	  into	  better	  thought	  out	  conceivability,	   in	  which	  the	  relevant	  situation	  becomes	  more	  fine-­‐	  grained,	  
and,	   perhaps,	   the	   evidential	   connection	   decreases	   in	   defeasibility,	   until	   one	   comes	   to	   some	   form	   of	   fully	  
constrained	   conceivability,	   where	   no	   further	   fine-­‐graining	   is	   possible,	   and	   the	   link	   to	   possibility	   is	  
indefeasible	  because	  the	  possible	  world	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  relevant	  physics.	  
Many,	   perhaps	   most,	   metaphysicians	   are	   still	   hanging	   out	   at	   the	   far	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   where	  
conceivability	   is,	   if	   not	  unconstrained,	   then	   limited	  only	  by	   intuition	  or	  broad	  metaphysical	  principles.	  But	  
attitudes	  appear	   to	  be	   shifting.	   In	   recent	   years	   there	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	   conferences	  and	  workshops	  
bringing	  together	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  scientists,	  and	  metaphysicians	  and	  resulting	  in	  associated	  special	  
issues	  and	  collections.	  More	  metaphysicians	  are	  beginning	  to	  engage	  seriously	  with	  physics,	  whether	  via	  a	  
consideration	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  relativity	  theory	  for	  issues	  of	  persistence	  or	  via	  the	  incorporation	  of	  non-­‐
supervenient	   quantum	   relations	   in	   bundle	   theoretic	   accounts	   of	   objects.	   Here,	   then,	   there	   are	   welcome	  
signs	  of	  new	  bridges	  being	  built	  as	  well	  as	  old	  connections	  being	  used	  in	  new	  ways.	  
But	  more	  than	  this,	   there	   is	  growing	  awareness	  that	   in	  their	  exploration	  of	  the	  space	  of	  possibilities	  
metaphysicians	  have	  developed	  various	  sets	  of	  tools	  that	  might	  then	  be	  appropriated	  and	  usefully	  employed	  
by	  philosophers	  of	  science	   (French	  and	  McKenzie	  2012).	  These	   include	  not	  only	  comparatively	  well-­‐known	  
concepts	  such	  as	  supervenience	  and	  dependence	  but	  also	  general	  strategies,	  manoeuvres,	  or	  metaphysical	  
moves	   in	   general.	   Thus,	   Teller	   long	   ago	   appropriated	   the	   concept	   of	   supervenience	   for	   the	   philosophy	   of	  
science	   and	   employed	   it	   to	   articulate	   a	   view	   of	   quantum	   entanglement	   as	   involving	   non-­‐supervenient	  
relations	  (Teller	  1986).	  Notions	  of	  dependence	  of	  course	  feature	  prominently	  in	  discussion	  of	  causation	  but	  
have	   recently	  been	  applied	   to	   consideration	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  numbers,	   say,	   and	  mathematical	  
structures	   (Linnebo	   2008)	   or	   between	   elementary	   particles	   and	   the	   symmetries	   of	   the	   Standard	   Model	  
(McKenzie	  forthcoming).	  Moving	  to	  the	  more	  general	  level	  of	  argumentative	  strategies	  and	  manoeuvres,	  it	  is	  
interesting	   to	   consider	   how	   eliminativism	   in	   physics,	   for	   example,	   might	   be	   supported	   by	   the	   moves	  
deployed	  by	  metaphysical	  monists	  and	  nihilists	  elsewhere.	  Thus	  Horgan	  and	  Potrč	  (2008)	  have	  defended	  a	  
monistic	   ontology—there	   is	   only	   one	   thing,	   called	   (with	   tongue	   in	   cheek)	   “the	   blob”—by	   invoking	   a	  
distinction	  between	   truth	  as	  direct	  and	  as	   indirect	   correspondence,	  with	   the	   latter	  articulated	   in	   terms	  of	  
contextually	  understood	  semantic	  standards.	  Cameron	  (2008),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  offers	  an	  alternative	  form	  
of	   truth-­‐maker	   theory,	   in	   which	   the	   truth	   of	   sentences	   referring	   to	   putative	   entities	   is	   grounded	   in	  
something	  other	  than	  those	  entities.	  
So,	   to	   take	   a	   well-­‐known	   example	   from	   the	   history	   of	   science,	   the	   truth	   of	   statements	   made	   by	  
Eddington	   about	   his	   table	   can,	   on	   Cameron’s	   account,	   be	   grounded	   in	   the	   relevant	   elementary	   particles	  
“arranged	   table-­‐wise.”	   Now	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   such	   particles	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	   metaphysicians’	  
infamous	   “simples,”	   and	   also	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   we	   are	   supposed	   to	   understand	   “arrangement”	   in	   this	  
context,	  remain	  contentious,	  and	  here	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  further	  to-­‐and-­‐fro	  traffic	  across	  the	  metaphysical	  
bridge.	   But	   the	   point	   is	   that	   there	   are	   potentially	   useful	   sets	   of	   tools	   in	   the	  metaphysicians’	   toolbox	   that	  
philosophers	  of	  science	  might	  avail	   themselves	  of	  and	  deploy.	  Of	  course,	  this	  raises	  further	   issues,	  such	  as	  
how	  tools	  developed	  far	  away	  in	  possibility	  space,	  as	  it	  were,	  can	  be	  of	  any	  use	  in	  understanding	  science	  as	  
developed	   in	   this,	   the	   actual,	   world,	   or	   whether	   the	   use	   of	   such	   tools	   puts	   the	   philosophy	   of	   science	   in	  
tension	   with	   the	   naturalistic	   tendency	   that	   is	   currently	   prominent.	   If,	   however,	   we	   accept	   that	   the	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  to	  achieve	  an	  appropriate	  balance	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  drawing	  on	  both	  the	  
practice	  and	  the	  history	  of	  science,	  as	   indicated	  above,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  articulating	  an	  account	  or	  
view	  of	  science	  that	  is	  more	  than	  just	  a	  series	  of	  case	  studies	  and	  that	  involves	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  kinds	  





As	  we	   indicated,	   this	   is	   a	   very	  personal	   view	  of	  potentially	   fruitful	   developments	   in	   two	   selected	  areas	  of	  
contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  As	  well	  as	  exciting	  new	  work	   in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  particular	  sciences,	  
especially	  philosophy	  of	  the	  bio-­‐medical	  sciences	  and	  neurosciences,	  some	  of	  the	  standard	  topics	  still	  have	  
the	   capacity	   to	   generate	   interesting	   lines	   of	   inquiry:	   the	   role	   of	   mathematics	   in	   science,	   for	   example,	  
particularly	   its	   role	   in	   explanation;	   decision	   theory	   and	   reasoning	   under	   uncertainty	   in	   general;	   and	   the	  
nature	  of	  scientific	  representation,	  where	  useful	  connections	  have	  been	  drawn	  with	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art,	  
just	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  Even	  the	  realism-­‐antirealism	  debate,	  which	  for	  some	  may	  appear	  stagnant	  as	  the	  various	  
combatants	  remain	  locked	  in	  their	  respective	  positions,	  shows	  signs	  of	  renewed	  vigour	  as,	  for	  example,	  the	  
role	   of	   case	   studies	   in	   propping	   up	   such	   positions	   is	   re-­‐examined.	   Some	   years	   ago	   an	   elder	   statesman	  
patiently	  explained	  to	  one	  of	  us	  that	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  was	  moribund	  and	  doomed	  to	  shrink	  and	  fade	  
as	   its	  original	   impetus	  lost	  steam.	  In	  fact,	  the	  field	  seems	  more	  alive	  with	  ideas	  and	  exciting	  developments	  
than	  ever,	  as	  it	  engages	  both	  with	  science	  itself	  and	  with	  philosophy	  more	  broadly.	  As	  editors,	  we	  are	  proud	  
to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  this	  venerable	  tradition	  that	  has	  published,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  publish,	  the	  very	  best	  results	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